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Abstract: Commentators such as Terence Irwin (1999) and Christopher Shields (2006) claim that the 
Ring of Gyges argument in Republic II cannot demonstrate that justice is chosen only for its 
consequences. This is because valuing justice for its own sake is compatible with judging its value to 
be overridable. Through examination of the rational commitments involved in valuing normative 
ideals such as justice, we aim to show that this analysis is mistaken. If Glaucon is right that everyone 
would endorse Gyges’ behavior, it follows that nobody values justice intrinsically. Hence, the Gyges 
story constitutes a more serious challenge than critics maintain.    
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In Republic II, Glaucon recounts the story of Gyges’ ring in order to bolster the case against justice. 
According to the story, a shepherd named Gyges utilized an invisibility ring to seduce the king’s 
wife, kill the king, and take over the kingdom (360b).1 Glaucon argues that anyone who came into 
possession of such a ring would perform similarly unjust acts, and that anyone who would refrain 
from injustice in such circumstances “would be thought wretched and stupid by everyone aware of 
the situation” (360d). Glaucon presents this as strong evidence that justice is thought to be valuable 
only to the extent that one lacks the power to get away with injustice (359b).   
 Glaucon’s argument appears successful in showing that we do not value justice as much as 
Socrates believes we should. Yet we might still wonder whether it supports the stronger claim that 
we do not value justice for its own sake at all. Commentators such as Terence Irwin (1999) and 
Christopher Shields (2006) claim that Glaucon’s argument could not show that justice is valued only 
                                                 
1 Translations follow Reeve 2004, with some slight modification. The Greek is from Burnet 1900-1907. 
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for its consequences because believing that power and wealth outweigh justice in some 
circumstances is compatible with intrinsically valuing justice to some overridable degree. Let us call 
this claim the compatibility thesis.  
 In this article, we argue that the compatibility thesis is false and hence that the soundness of 
the Gyges argument would indeed demonstrate that nobody values justice for its own sake. The 
upshot is that Glaucon’s argument constitutes a more serious challenge to the purported value of 
justice than is often thought.  
 
1. The Compatibility Thesis 
In explicating the compatibility thesis, Irwin writes: “Gyges might suppose that justice has some 
slight intrinsic value in addition to the value that depends on its consequences, but he might take the 
good consequences of injustice to outweigh this intrinsic value of justice” (1999, 173). In a similar 
vein, Shields explains that someone’s choosing to follow an unjust path cannot show that they don’t 
value justice intrinsically because it may just be a matter of degree: “In making such a choice, we 
would no doubt consider the relevant degrees and thresholds and make our decisions accordingly” 
(2006, 79). These claims certainly conform to ordinary experience; people regularly choose Y over X 
despite viewing X as intrinsically valuable. With this in mind, Irwin concludes that “Glaucon should 
ask not only whether we care about justice for its own sake, but also how much we care about it” 
(1999, 173).  
  If Glaucon’s argument cannot show that justice is valued only for its consequences, this 
raises questions about the point of its inclusion in Book II. Here one might follow Shields in 
viewing the Gyges story as of little utility for Glaucon’s purposes but rightly included by Plato as a 
mechanism for causing readers to reflect on their level of commitment to justice (2006, 76-77). But 
Glaucon seemingly takes the thought experiment to have probative force in regards to his dialectical 
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aims, and so we should adopt this reading only after we’ve exhausted alternatives that would give the 
argument more significance.  
 Irwin proposes such an alternative. On his reading, what Glaucon aims to show is not that 
we value justice only instrumentally, but rather that we do not think justice is more valuable than 
injustice in all circumstances. Glaucon asks Socrates, “Do you want to seem to have persuaded us that 
it is better in every way to be just than unjust, or do you want to truly convince us of this?” (357a4-b2, 
emphasis added). Irwin suggests that we should understand “in every way” to mean “better in every 
possible circumstance” (1999, 175).  
The appeal to the “in every way” clause provides a reasonable explanation for the role of the 
Gyges argument that meshes with Irwin’s analysis. However, the context in which the argument is 
presented makes this interpretation rather surprising. Note that just before recounting the story, 
Glaucon provides a threefold classification of goods and claims that most everyone takes justice to 
be a type-3 good (i.e. burdensome in itself and pursued for the sake of its consequences) (358a).2 
And shortly thereafter, Glaucon prefaces the Gyges story by claiming that it will allow us to see most 
clearly that those who practice justice do so only out of necessity (359b6-d1). This suggests that 
Glaucon’s aim is to show that nobody values justice for its own sake. Hence, we have good reason 
to subject the compatibility thesis to further scrutiny.  
 
 
                                                 
2 Although the division of goods is a source of interpretive controversy, we shall focus primarily on exploring the 
rational commitments involved in valuing justice for its own sake. Investigation of this issue does not require taking a 
stance on whether intrinsic valuing means ‘independently of consequences’ (Kirwan 1965; Mabbott 1978; Reeve 1988) 
or ‘because of the attached (rather than ancillary) consequences’ (Foster 1937; Annas 1981; White 1984; Pappas 1995). 
For recent discussion, see Heinaman 2002 and Payne 2011.  
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2. Normative Objects and the Limiting Requirement  
At first blush, the claim that valuing justice for its own sake is compatible with believing that 
considerations of justice can be offset by the allure of wealth and power seems plausible. Viewing 
something as choiceworthy in and of itself does not commit one to valuing that thing above all else. 
Nonetheless, if we look closely at the ring of Gyges and what it asks us to consider, this analysis 
begins to appear less plausible. Consider first that the sincerity of our evaluative judgments is 
contingent upon our behaviors, dispositions, and the related judgements that we make. This is seen 
most readily when the object of our valuing is itself partly constituted by ethical norms or standards. 
Let us call the various ethical principles, moral ideals, and virtues that one might value normative 
objects. If an agent genuinely values a normative object for its own sake (as opposed to merely 
feigning to do so), then she will not reflectively endorse behaviors and attitudes that directly violate 
the principles and standards of which it is composed. This is because intrinsically valuing a 
normative object involves endorsement of the constitutive principles and standards.  
To illustrate, consider the case of a hiring manager who claims to value racial equality for its 
own sake. Suppose this manager consistently and intentionally favors job applications from 
members of her own race even when they are less qualified than other applicants. When confronted 
about her hiring practices the manager says, “I do care about racial equality for its own sake, but I 
also believe that whenever someone has a chance to help a member of their own race, that’s the 
right thing to do.” Valuing the ideal of racial equality for its own sake is incompatible with endorsing 
overtly racist attitudes and behaviors. Hence, we can conclude that the hiring manager either does 
not know what racial equality is, or else her claim to value it intrinsically is mere lip service.  
Be that as it may, exceptional circumstances can make it possible for a person to value a 
normative object intrinsically while still acting in ways that might undermine it. For example, a hiring 
manager can intrinsically value racial equality while knowingly participating in a racist hiring practice. 
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It might be the case that a racist CEO threatens to fire the hiring manager if she does not hire 
persons of a certain race. The hiring manager may sincerely want to refrain from this practice while 
also knowing that if she does not comply she will lose her job and health insurance, thus having no 
means to care for her sickly daughter. If the hiring manager decides to follow the CEO’s orders, it 
can still be true that she values racial equality for its own sake; it may just be that she values the life 
and health of her daughter even more.  
The crucial point is that the circumstances that render the flouting of a normative object 
compatible with valuing it for its own sake cannot be constituted by the very considerations that the 
normative object precludes from having justificatory weight. The reason it is certain that the first 
hiring manager does not value racial equality for its own sake is that the ideal of racial equality 
precludes the mere fact that another person is a member of one’s race from justifying the 
preferential treatment of that person—this preclusion is an essential element of the normative 
object. In contrast, it might still be true that the hiring manager in the second scenario values racial 
equality for its own sake because the ideal of racial equality does not preclude a concern for the 
health and safety of one’s child from justifying the preferential treatment of members of a certain 
race—such a preclusion is not an essential element of the normative object. 
Let us turn then to the case of justice. As a normative object, justice is similar to racial 
equality in that genuinely valuing it for its own sake involves endorsing its essential principles and 
standards. Hence, valuing justice for its own sake is incompatible with rational endorsement of 
undermining behaviors when the ostensible justification for the undermining involves 
considerations that justice itself precludes from having justificatory weight. To see what the relevant 
considerations are, we need to look closely at what justice encompasses. Returning to the context of 
the Republic, we must remember that the discussants in Book II have yet to complete their 
investigation into the nature and value of justice. However, any such investigation must begin with 
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some basic assumptions. One reasonable assumption about justice is what we call the Limiting 
Requirement:   
Limiting Requirement: Being a just person requires viewing the interests of others as 
placing limits on what one can permissibly do in pursuit of effective goods (e.g. 
wealth and political power). 
 Not only does the limiting requirement seem central to any plausible conception of justice, 
the context of the dialogue suggests that it is part of the conception of justice with which Glaucon is 
working. First, the fact that justice places limits on the pursuit of wealth and power explains why 
Glaucon has doubts about the value of justice in the first place. It is precisely because justice appears 
to conflict with self-interest in some circumstances that he implores Socrates to provide a rousing 
defense. Second, note that the idea expressed by the limiting requirement falls under the broad 
notion of fairness. A person who does not view the interests of others as placing limits on what can 
defensibly be done in pursuit of wealth and power is someone who places no weight on 
considerations of fairness. This is important because Glaucon invokes the notion of fairness when 
prefacing the Gyges argument in Book II. In explaining why the ostensibly just person will act 
exactly as the unjust person would in circumstances of immunity, Glaucon says, “The reason for this 
is the desire to outdo others and get more and more [pleonxian]. This is what every nature naturally 
pursues as good, but by law and force, it is made to deviate from this path and honor fairness 
[paragetai epi tên tou isou timên]” (359c). Here Glaucon uses “fairness” (isos) as interchangeable with 
“justice,” and the limiting requirement is clearly involved in any plausible notion of fairness. 
Given the centrality of the limiting requirement to the very notion of justice, the analysis we 
are challenging would attribute the following set of judgments to the agent in question: 
A. One ought to view the interests of others as placing limits on what one can 
permissibly do in pursuit of power and wealth. 
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B. Whenever the potential gain in power and wealth is sizeable enough, one is 
justified in acting with utter disregard for the interests of others.   
The tension between these judgments undermines the compatibility thesis. It is difficult to see how 
one could coherently value justice for its own sake while simultaneously judging that it is overridable 
by the very sort of considerations that it constitutively takes precedence over. 
 
3.  Justice as Part of One’s Own Good 
When considering evaluative attitudes there is a natural tendency to think in terms of the 
comparative value assigned to possible states of affairs, without particular regard for how one’s own 
agency is connected to them. And if valuing justice for its own sake (in the relevant sense) were 
merely a matter of preferring states of affairs in which justice is generally realized over those in 
which it is not (when all else is equal), then the compatibility thesis would be true. To see why, it will 
help to return to the example of racial equality. Strange as it would be, it is possible for an agent to 
assign intrinsic value to states of affairs in which racial equality is widely practiced, while also 
believing that she has decisive reason to prioritize the interests of members of her own race. Perhaps 
the agent attributes no value to states of affairs in which individuals favor members of races other 
than their own, some value to states of affairs in which racial equality prevails, and most value to states 
of affairs in which everyone favors members of their own race. Likewise, it is possible for an agent 
to assign some intrinsic value to states of affairs in which justice is widely practiced while still 
preferring unjust states of affairs in which she becomes rich and powerful. Hence, if valuing justice 
for its own sake were only a matter of having certain preferences concerning states of affairs, it 
would be true that assigning intrinsic value to justice is compatible with endorsing Gyges’ behavior.   
However, while we grant that agents with the evaluative attitudes described above are 
conceivable, they would not value the respective normative objects (racial equality and justice) 
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intrinsically—at least not in the relevant sense. Assigning some intrinsic value to states of affairs in 
which racial equality obtains is not the same as valuing racial equality itself—i.e. racial equality qua 
normative object. A person who intrinsically values a normative object itself is someone who accepts 
and embraces the central principles and requirements for herself and believes that others ought to 
do the same. This explains why it would be inapt to describe the agent from the previous example, 
whose strongest preference is for a world in which everyone prioritizes the interests of their own 
race, as someone who values racial equality for its own sake.  
That the relevant assessment concerns valuing normative objects themselves rather than 
merely having preferences for certain states of affairs is clear from the context of the debate in Book 
II. The central question of the discussion concerns the ends and ideals that a person must pursue 
and adopt in order to live well. This is evident from the text. When Socrates declares that justice is 
among the finest goods, he says that “anyone who is going to be blessed with happiness must love [it] 
both because of itself and because of its consequences” (egô mên oimai, ên d’ egô, en tô kallistô, ho kai di’ 
auto kai dia ta gignomena ap’ autou agapêteon tô mellonti makariô esesthai) (358a1-3, emphasis added). The 
reference to the agent’s own happiness is evidence that the topic of concern is whether justice is 
intrinsically good for the agent who pursues it. Consider also Glaucon’s introduction of the third 
category of goods: “We’d say that these are burdensome but beneficial to us, and we wouldn’t choose 
them for their own sakes, but for the sake of the rewards and other things that come from them” 
(tauta gar emipona phaimen an, ôphelein de hêmas, kai auta men heautôn heneka ouk an dexaimetha exein, tôn de 
misthôn te charin kai tôn allôn hosa gignetai ap’ autôn) (357c7-d2, emphasis added).  
Clearly the relevant notion of intrinsic valuing at issue involves choosing the object as a non-
instrumental part of one’s own good. And a person who chooses to pursue justice as a non-
instrumental part of her good is someone who accepts and embraces the central norms of justice for 
herself. Such an agent would not think that it is enough to perform the acts that a just person would 
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on only those occasions in which she would not profit from injustice. This is because the non-
instrumental value of justice could not be realized by the mere performance of a handful of 
ostensibly just acts; the value could only be realized by being just (or at least striving to become just). 
And one cannot make a sincere effort to become just while simultaneously endorsing the complete 
disregard of others whenever the financial rewards are sufficiently great.3 In light of these points, we 
reconstruct Glaucon’s argument as follows: 
1. Any agent who chooses to pursue justice as a non-instrumental part of their good is 
    someone who strives to become a just person.  
2. Any agent who strives to become a just person is someone with a reasonably stable  
    commitment to justice; their reflective endorsement of giving consideration to the  
    interests of others does not depend on the amount of riches obtainable by disregarding  
    those interests.      
3. Any agent who chooses to pursue justice as a non-instrumental part of their good is  
    someone with a reasonably stable commitment to justice. (1-2)  
4. Anyone who would reflectively endorse Gyges’ acts does not have a reasonably stable  
    commitment to justice because they reject norms that are central to it.   
5. Everyone would reflectively endorse Gyges’ acts (at least in private).   
6. Nobody has a reasonably stable commitment to justice. (4-5) 
7. Nobody chooses justice as a non-instrumental part of their good. (3 and 6)  
                                                 
3 In order for the non-instrumental value of justice to be realized in one’s life, the commitment needn’t be of such a 
degree that the agent could never succumb to the temptation to act unjustly. Rather, the agent who values justice in the 
relevant sense is someone who would not calmly and reflectively endorse clear violations of the basic norms of justice. 
Glaucon’s challenge is made formidable by his claim that everyone would give a rational endorsement of Gyges’ 
behavior, were they to answer honestly. 
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On this characterization, the goal of the Gyges argument is not just to refute the claim that most 
people think justice is always more choiceworthy than injustice. Rather, the goal is to show that none 
of us value justice for its own sake at all. 
 If nobody chooses to pursue justice for its own sake, this is a prima facie reason to doubt 
that it ought to be chosen for its own sake; we would need strong grounds for believing that so many 
people are making such a significant error. Hence, Plato includes the Gyges story in the dialogue not 
merely to force us to think about the extent of our commitment to justice but also because it 
represents a significant challenge to the supposed superiority of the just life.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Earlier versions of this article were presented at an American Philosophical Association Central Division Meeting, 
Australian Catholic University, and Florida Atlantic University. We thank attendees of those presentations for helpful 
questions and comments. We are especially grateful to Robert Audi, Hugh Benson, Eric Brown, Stephanie Collins, Julia 
Driver, Fay Edwards, Jason Gardner, Daniel Hagen, Ashley Kennedy, David Killoren, Sarah Malanowski, Richard 
Rowland, Travis Timmerman, and an anonymous reviewer for useful suggestions.    
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